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Although it is true, as is stated in the intro-
duction to the book, that Kant’s political 
philosophy has served as the inspiration 
for the foundation of important political 
devices in the course of the previous cen-
tury, essentially after the Second World 
War (human rights, the United Nations, 
the continental blocs, etc., the development 
of a humanitarian language in general), it 
is also true that the reception of Kant was 
the product of two clearly isolated agen-
cies. These are, on the one hand, the ac-
ademic world, concerned centrally with 
hermeneutic questions, often innocuous 
from the practical point of view, and, on 
the other, the public in general, which, in 
view of the application of Kant’s thought, 
has frequently used his ideas with little 
theoretical exactitude and, for this very 
reason, failed to take advantage of the 
conceptual riches which would be offered 
by an attentive and careful reading of its 
sources. From this point of view, the book 
is presented as a point of communication 
between these two hitherto separate spheres 
of reception. Thus, its objective is not only 
to offer a coherent vision of Kant’s polit-
ical philosophy on the basis of a detailed 
analysis of the sources, but, in addition, 
to elucidate the theoretical tools which 
are to be found in his thought with which 
we can confront at the global level the 
great political challenges of our century. 
The book is a resource for the specialists 
alone but also for political agents who aim 
to take intelligent action in the search for 
peace and the defence of human rights. It 
is a hermeneutically careful interpretation 
of Kant’s political philosophy which is, at 
the same time, sharp and committed to the 
problems of our times. 
The book is divided into three Parts (I. 
Human Rights, II. Peace and III. Progress), 
which are divided, in turn, into three Chap-
ters each. The different theoretical frame-
works used, the discussions into which the 
book intervenes, and the hypothesis de-
veloped in each Part are stated clearly in 
the Introduction. This thus offers a rapid 
and useful overview of the most import-
ant contents of the book. 
In Part I, “Human Rights”, the prob-
lematic of this type of “right” is analysed, 
the most important questions are deter-
mined, and the “justification problem” is 
described, together with the different re-
sponses to this question which we have 
at present. In this context, Caranti makes 
Kant intervene in the discussion through 
the reconstruction of the elements which 
are fruitful for a “strong” justification of 
human rights, without for that reason fall-
ing into dogmatisms or a “simple-minded 
humanism”. In relation to the problems 
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associated with a certain “occidentalism” 
into which the defence of human rights 
could fall, the author shows that Kant’s 
political philosophy provides us with a 
sane and pertinent combination – which 
enables us to confront those problems – 
of the universalism of the principles with 
a particularism in the application of those 
principles. Towards the end of this first 
Part, the author develops an argument 
about human rights which, although in-
spired by Kant, distances itself from him 
on several important points. 
According to the author’s argument, al-
though Kant did not and could not know 
the technical term “human rights”, it is 
possible to offer a reconstruction of a jus-
tification of this kind of right on the basis 
of an analysis of the grounding which the 
philosopher gives to the inborn “right to 
external freedom”. Kant would have de-
fended a conception of human rights (that 
is, the inborn “right to external freedom”) 
through a substantive conception of “hu-
man dignity”, based, not merely on prac-
tical liberty (as a faculty of choosing be-
tween alternative actions), but rather on 
the concept of autonomy (as “the ability to 
act under self-imposed moral constraints”, 
p. 57). According to Caranti, autonomy ap-
pears as a privileged basis of the concept 
of human dignity, as a foundation which 
serves both common sense and “all mayor 
cultural traditions and revealed religions” 
(p. 57). In the face of other solutions to the 
“justification problem” which the author 
presents and discusses in detail, the Kan-
tian proposal is offered as the most solid 
alternative. However, with the end of mak-
ing the Kantian justification of the concept 
of “human rights” (that is of the “right to 
external freedom”) even more inclusive 
and modern, the author proposes two im-
portant modifications. In the first place, he 
argues that we must accept (against Kant) 
that not only human beings, but also the 
animals, act morally, with a certain degree 
of autonomy and are, because of this, wor-
thy of respect and the subjects of rights. In 
the second place, distancing himself again 
from the literal meaning of Kant, who, as 
is known, bases the concept of autonomy 
on the “categorical imperative”, the author 
proposes underpinning the concept of au-
tonomy with any general principle which 
could function as an original grounding of 
moral decision. That is, it could be sup-
ported not only by the categorial impera-
tive, but also by some principle inspired, 
for example, by the Aristotelian concept of 
the ethical life or even the “Golden Rule” 
(one of whose formulations would read, 
“Do unto others as you would wish them 
to do unto you”, p. 64), etc. 
With respect to Caranti’s second pro-
posal, I would like to make one observa-
tion. Kant bases his concept of autonomy 
on the respect for the categorical impera-
tive as the consequence of strong internal 
reasons. In particular, through the strict-
ly formal character of this principle Kant 
guarantees that it belongs exclusively to 
reason and thus guarantees that no exter-
nal content or end interferes with moral 
determination. Rational beings are auton-
omous when they act out of respect for the 
categorical imperative because they do so in 
relation to a principle which has its source 
in pure practical reason. Now, if autono-
my is guaranteed, as Caranti wants it to be, 
through the determination to act in con-
formity with any general principle, we are 
confronted with an undesirable alternative: 
if the principle in question is not given to 
the agent by reason, but rather they must 
decide it voluntarily, the question arises of 
the lack of a criterion for deciding between 
general moral principles. The consequence 
is that the decision to subordinate oneself 
to one general principle or another appears 
arbitrary. If, on the other hand, the prin-
ciple in question is given to the agent, not 
by means of their reason, but rather, for 
example, through culture, the state or re-
ligion, it becomes difficult to maintain an 
acceptable concept of “autonomy”. This 
second alternative also brings the difficul-
ty that it does not permit us to establish a 
sharp division between moral determina-
tion mediated by, for example, the Golden 
Rule and by a morally perverse principle, 
such as the determination to act in accor-
dance with the will of the Führer in Nazi 
Germany. Although the author’s proposal 
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makes Kantian morals more flexible and 
more suitable to our contemporary vision 
of the moral life – this is unquestionably a 
major effort – this point should be quali-
fied. It is not a question of satisfying spe-
cifically Kantian requirements, but rath-
er those of anyone who seeks to defend a 
consistent concept of “moral autonomy”.
Part II, “Peace”, analyses the “Demo-
cratic Peace Theory” (DPT). Initially de-
veloped by the political philosopher Mi-
chael Doyle in “Kant, Liberal Legacies and 
Public Affairs” during the nineteen eight-
ies, this has had a far-reaching influence 
in the present. One of the central theses 
of this theory which, according to Doyle, 
would have been announced by Kant long 
before it could be proved empirically, is 
the directly proportion relationship be-
tween democracy and peace. Although 
there are different variants of the DPT, 
which Caranti describes and discusses, in 
general, the central point defended within 
this framework is that, for 200 years, that 
is to say, since their very birth, the liber-
al democracies (the “republics”, in Kan-
tian terminology) have not entered into 
nor have had to enter into war with each 
other. The objective of this section of the 
book is to weigh up the problems and de-
fects of the DPT through an analysis of the 
tract, To Perpetual Peace (1795), and of the 
different critiques which have been made 
of this theory from a conceptual and his-
torical point of view. (In fact, as the au-
thor recognizes, the DPT is challenged by 
multiple and important counterexamples 
from the nineteenth century to the pres-
ent.) The three permanent conditions of 
peace (republicanism, federalism and cos-
mopolitan right) outlined by Kant in the 
tract of 1795, read carefully, offer, accord-
ing to the author, a valuable resource for 
a more solid DPT. In Caranti’s reading, it 
is not just a question of the fact that the 
three conditions must function jointly so 
as to guarantee peace, as Doyle argues, 
but also of understanding them correctly. 
Thus, the author offers an interpretation 
of those conditions which he contrasts 
with that offered by the defenders of the 
DPT. Unlike the reading which the latter 
defend, Caranti offers one which contains 
the following points. First, the republic 
must be distinguished from “liberal de-
mocracy”: the latter watches over the par-
ticular interests of the individuals, while in 
the former the equal status of the citizens 
is protected. Second, the federation of the 
nations must be considered a league not 
only of republican but also non-repub-
lican states. Finally, foreigners’ right to 
visit must be interpreted not merely as a 
“right to trade”, but also, in general terms, 
as a right to community or to society, or, 
inversely, as the obligation on the part of 
the states to guarantee the human rights 
of foreigners, a guarantee which would 
lead to the development of a global moral 
consciousness. Moreover, the author ar-
gues that the “right to trade” which would 
promote peace does not imply, according 
to Kant, the right to all forms of trade, but 
only to those forms of exchange which are 
fair for all the parties involved.
In this section the author shows how, 
understood properly, Kant’s political phi-
losophy presents itself as a valuable re-
source for correcting a theory which has 
had a major impact in our times and, at 
the same time, for defining those funda-
mental guidelines which politicians ought 
to follow in order to promote peace. Par-
ticularly worthy of attention is the charge 
that Caranti makes at the end of this Part, 
according to which the DPT, even in the 
version refined by Doyle, would oscillate 
in a way which is “politically dangerous”. 
For Kant, as the author correctly argues, 
republicanism, federalism and the right to 
visit are norms of action which guarantee 
or supposedly lead to peace, but the DPT 
moves between a descriptive or explana-
tory theory about how relations are and 
have been between democratic (liberal) 
states, on the one hand, and a theory which 
serves to justify certain wars, that is, those 
which involve a supposedly undemocratic 
state, on the other. (The DPT functioned 
in this way in George W. Bush’s speech-
es during the war against Iraq but is also 
used in this way by Doyle himself [p.198], 
although with a different meaning from 
that of the former.) 
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Finally, Part III, “Progress”, analyses the 
Kantian conception of history presented 
both in the essay Idea for a Universal His-
tory with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784) 
and in To Perpetual Peace (1795). It aims to 
establish and make credible the theoretical 
reasons for which, according to Kant, both 
greater respect for human rights and the 
establishment of peace can be expected in 
a nearer or more distant future. 
On the basis of the tract of 1795, Ca-
ranti argues that the Kantian conception 
of historical progress could be vindicated 
if two conditions are observed. In the first 
place, the mechanism of the “unsocial so-
ciability” has to be separated from what is 
for contemporary standards, according to 
the author, the highly problematic notion 
of “natural dispositions” (this is, Caranti’s 
“Separability Thesis”) and, in the second 
place, the conception of historical prog-
ress has to be studied in conjunction with 
the general premises of what, for Kant, hu-
man nature is. The prediction of human 
development towards progress is possible 
taking uniquely into consideration “cer-
tain constant feature[s] of human beings” 
(p. 210) such as, for example, “unsocial 
sociability” (p. 215), the “limited benevo-
lence and ability to learn” (p. 216), or the 
“pursuit of happiness or self-love” (p. 233), 
and certain objective circumstances of the 
external world. The result is to offer a re-
construction of the argument for which, 
according to Kant, there are reasons – high-
ly plausible according to present-day can-
ons - to believe that a non-linear progress 
towards a cosmopolitan constitution (and 
therefore not its alternatives: regression or 
stagnation) is the most probable course of 
development in human affairs. Because of 
this, the author distances himself from the 
usual interpretations, according to which 
historical “progress” must be understood 
in a merely regulatory or even “practical” 
form. In line with this, the author analyses 
the First Supplement to the text of To Per-
petual Peace (1795), in which Kant presents 
his much discussed “Guarantee Thesis” 
according to which “nature ensures that 
humans will one day achieve a condition 
of perpetual peace” (p. 218). Caranti offers 
an interpretation of this affirmation which, 
by contrast with other readings, makes it 
not only compatible with Kant’s critical 
philosophy, but also epistemologically sig-
nificant. In that Supplement Kant would 
not defend a teleology based on “nature 
or providence ends”, but rather a theory 
about the existing mechanisms by means 
of which progress towards the cosmopoli-
tan condition can be forecast. In this way, 
Caranti reads the texts of 1784 and 1795 as 
being in harmony with each other. 
Here, I would like to make an obser-
vation about the strategy of eliminating 
teleology from Kant’s conception of his-
tory. According to the point of view of the 
model of the development of nature which 
appears to have won the battle (Darwin-
ism or some version of Darwinism), all 
reference to natural “ends” or “disposi-
tions” (or “ends of providence”) must re-
main outside the realm of scientific dis-
course. In this context Caranti attempts to 
cleanse Kant’s history of philosophy of its 
teleological assumptions. He thus shows 
that his conception of historical progress 
is perfectly sustainable without those as-
sumptions. Thus, the natural mechanism 
would be a concept sufficient for explain-
ing human development even from a point 
of view which would have to be admitted 
by Kant himself. But we must note that, 
as the author demonstrates, according to 
Kant, the horizon of the natural mecha-
nism would coincide with the highest ends 
of reason, the institution of a perfect civil 
constitution (a republic) in both its inter-
nal and external relations, perpetual peace, 
etc. Is this coincidence not just a little too 
happy? Should not this coincidence itself 
be the object of explanation? Is not this 
explanation, precisely, something which 
Kant’s teleological comprehension of his-
tory could offer us? However it may be, I 
think that underlying the author’s theoret-
ical perspective is a tendency to consid-
er all forms of teleological thought to be 
“dogmatic”, when in fact one of the great 
achievements of Kant’s critical philosophy 
is that of offering a “critical grounding” for 
that kind of reasoning. Perhaps not only 
some kind of Darwinism, but also social 
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and political theory could take advantage 
of a critically grounded teleological com-
prehension.
In the final Chapter of the last Part, 
history is approached from the point of 
view of the political agent and their in-
terest in articulating their efforts towards 
progress, that is to say, in this context, to-
wards perpetual peace. In particular, that 
section studies the nature of the prudent 
subordination of the political to the mor-
al which is expected of the moral politi-
cian, a figure which, in Caranti’s analysis 
condenses two fundamentals. On the one 
hand, it contains the thesis of the subor-
dination of the political to the moral, and 
on the other, it accommodates the thesis 
of the primacy of politics, for the art of 
prudence which the moral politician ex-
ercises exceeds the moral and defines the 
sphere of autonomy proper to politics. 
Unlike the First Supplement of To Perpet-
ual Peace in which, according to what we 
saw above in Caranti’s interpretation, it is 
the “mechanism of nature” which leads to 
and guarantees peace, in the Appendix to 
the same text this role is exercised by the 
“the moral politician’s good will and his 
free decision inspired by duty” (p. 242). 
This does not, however, make us fall into 
a contradiction. To the contrary, in Ca-
ranti’s reading, we are confronted by two 
complementary theses: the moral poli-
tician does not replace the labour of the 
natural mechanism, but rather accelerates 
or promotes that which nature does in-
dependently of the will of human beings. 
The moral politician (unlike the political 
moralist and, above all, the moralizing 
politicians, figures Caranti also analyses 
carefully), therefore, defines the respon-
sibility which human beings, in general, 
and politics in particular, have in the face 
of the urgency of providing responses to 
the problems and challenges of our times. 
Kant’s Political Legacy: Human Rights, 
Peace, Progress is a book which is acces-
sible to the general public, although it is 
profound and enriching in all its sections. 
It is structured well, contains intelligent ar-
gumentative strategies, includes an up to 
date literature and participates in a series 
of fundamental current debates. It offers 
important theses both for the field of Kant 
studies and for politicians, functionaries, 
and activists concerned with giving a sol-
id theoretical grounding to the defence 
of human rights, the search for peace and 
the hope for progress. It opens a road to 
the renovation of the reception of “Kant’s 
political legacy” which I hope will increase 
still more and diversify both within the ac-
ademic world and outside of it.
